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Case Comments
Civil Rights: Housing Discrimination-
Revival of Civil Rights Act of 1866
Petitioners, in response to a newspaper advertisement, went
to a housing development, inspected the homes available, and
offered to purchase one. Respondents, the owners and operators
of the development, refused petitioner's offer because of their
policy not to sell to Negroes. Petitioners sought injunctive and
other relief, alleging violation of rights guaranteed under 42
U.S.C. section 1982, which provides that all citizens of the United
States, regardless of race or color, shall have the same right
to purchase or lease real and personal property as is enjoyed
by white citizens. The district court granted respondents' mo-
tion to dismiss,1 and the court of appeals affirmed on the
ground that section 1982 was limited to discrimination involving
state action, and thus did not extend to refusals to sell by private
individuals.2 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
holding that section 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private
as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the
statute, so construed, is a valid exercise of congressional power
to enforce the thirteenth amendment. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Company, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Following the Civil War, Congress attempted to insure the
fundamental rights of newly freed slaves by means of three con-
stitutional amendments and seven acts implementing their pro-
visions.3 The thirteenth amendment abolished slavery and au-
thorized its enforcement by appropriate acts of Congress. 4 Pur-
l. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo.
1966).
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
For further general discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion see 82
HARV. L. REV. 95 (1968) and 14 VLL. L. REv. 116 (1968).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. Congress enacted five
major civil rights acts. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335;
Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Enforcement Act of 1870,
ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, as amended, Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat.
433; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The other two acts
were designed exclusively to enforce the thirteenth amendment. Peon-
age Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); Slave Kidnapping Act,
ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866).
For a discussion of the provisions of these statutes see R. CARR,
FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIV=L RIGHTS, 35-40 (1947); Gressman, The Un-
happy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcn. L. REV. 1323-36
(1952); Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for
Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CmI. L. REv. 363, 365-70 (1953).
4. The thirteenth amendment provides:
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suant to this authorization, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 which declared that all persons born in the United
States are citizens thereof. It further provided, among other
guarantees, that all citizens, regardless of race or color, would
have the same right as white citizens to purchase and lease real
and personal property.5 Although Congress passed the Act over
the veto of President Andrew Johnson, many legislators had
reservations regarding its validity as thirteenth amendment legis-
lation. Others feared repeal by a subsequent session of Congress.
These factors provided major impetus for the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment. 6 It was proposed and acted upon by the
same Congress that passed the 1866 Act, and was adopted by the
states approximately two years later.7 In 1870, Congress enacted
the second Civil Rights Act, which specifically re-enacted the 1866
Act.8 Any lingering doubt as to its constitutional validity was
considered removed by its re-enactment after ratification of the
fourteenth amendment.9
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
5. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The guarantee of
equality in acquisition and sale of property is now contained in 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) which provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.
Section 1 of the 1866 Act provided additional substantive guarantees,
such as the right to make and enforce contracts, and the right to full
and equal benefit of laws protecting the security of person and prop-
erty. These are now contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
6. H. FLAcK, THE ADOPTiON OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDlvENT
94-95 (1908); J. TENBRoEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201-03 (1965); Hamilton,
The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9
NAT'L B.J. 69 (1951).
7. See 14 Stat. 358 (1866); 15 Stat. 708 (1868).
8. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140.
9. See H. FLACK, supra note 6, at 224; Gressman, supra note 3,
at 1333-34. The Court in the instant case viewed any doubts regarding
the constitutionality of § 1982 under the thirteenth amendment as un-
founded.
If Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to
eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and
renting property because of their race or color, then no federal
statute calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to
exceed the constitutional power of Congress simply because it
reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of private
individuals.
392 U.S. at 438-39.
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This period of congressional activity drew to a close when
the Supreme Court began to limit or nullify much of the new
civil rights legislation, primarily by adopting restrictive interpre-
tations of the supporting amendments.' 0 Both the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the thirteenth amendment were substantially
limited in scope, and contemporary legal attempts to secure racial
equality have not relied on either the guarantees of the Act or
the amendment.."
After the 1870 re-enactment of the 1866 Act, the question of
whether section 1982 was fourteenth or thirteenth amendment
legislation was infrequently considered, despite the significant
differences in the scope of the two amendments.' 2 Although
early cases grounded the validity of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
on the thirteenth amendment, 3 subsequent Supreme Court de-
cisions viewed section 1982 as based on the fourteenth amend-
ment and confined the statute to nullifying discriminatory state
action.' 4 Thus, it has been held to bar a racial zoning ordi-
10. R. CAm, supra note 3, at 40-47; Gressman, supra note 3, at
1336-43; Maslow & Robison, supra note 3, at 370-73.
11. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 6, at 157-97. See also Robison, The
Possibility of a Frontal Assault on the State Action Concept, with Spe-
cial Reference to the Right to Purchase Real Property Guaranteed in
42 U.S.C. § 1982, 41 NomE DAmV-E LAw. 455, 463-64 (1966).
Attempts to bar racial discrimination by builders of development
housing have generally been grounded on the fourteenth amendment,
without mention of § 1982. See, e.g., Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179
F. Supp. 851 (D. Md. 1960). Where § 1982 has been invoked, its validity
has been predicated on the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955). See generally
Comment, Application of the Fourteenth Amendment to Builders of Pri-
vate Housing, 12 KAN. L. REv. 426 (1964).
12. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883), while limiting
congressional authority under the fourteenth amendment to the pro-
hibition of discrimination through state action, indicated that the thir-
teenth amendment enabled Congress to enact legislation which was
"direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether
sanctioned by State legislation or not.. .. "
13. Three Supreme Court justices, in opinions delivered on cir-
cuit, viewed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as valid thirteenth amendment
legislation. United States v. Cruickshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711 (No.
14,897) (C.C.D. La. 1874) (Bradley, Circuit Justice); In re Turner, 24
F. Cas. 337, 339 (No. 14,247) (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (Chase, Circuit Jus-
tice); United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (No. 16,151) (C.C.D.
Ky. 1866) (Swayne, Circuit Justice).
14. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883). However, in United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882), the Court indicated in dicta that § 1982
was valid thirteenth amendment legislation. Mr. Justice Harlan's dis-
sent in the Civil Rights Cases expressed the same position. 109 U.S. 3,
35-36 (1883). In United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903),
a federal district court construed § 1982 by reference to the thirteenth
1969]
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nance,15 but not racially restrictive covenants between private
parties.' 6 The statute was more recently considered in Hurd v.
Hodge,' which held that section 1982 prohibits federal courts
from enforcing racially restrictive covenants. The Hurd Court
specifically stated that section 1982 was directed at governmental
action. 8
While the scope of the Act was being limited, congressional
power to reach private acts of discrimination under the thirteenth
amendment was also being judicially circumscribed. The ear-
lier cases had viewed the thirteenth amendment as granting Con-
gress broad power to secure the basic rights of newly freed
slaves,' 9 however, later rulings gradually adopted a restrictive
view of the legislative potential of the amendment.20  This nar-
row view culminated in Hodges v. United States,2' where a de-
nial, on racial grounds, of the right to contract for employment
was not found to be a condition of slavery within the thirteenth
amendment. The Court in Hodges stated that the thirteenth
amendment can only proscribe conduct which actually enslaves. 22
amendment, and upheld an indictment charging a conspiracy to deprive
Negroes of rights guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
Morris court stated that § 1982 could not be sustained under the four-
teenth amendment, since the Act reached the conduct of individuals
directly, without intervening state action.
15. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
16. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926).
17. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). Hurd was a companion case to Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which held that state court enforce-
ment of racially restrictive covenants was state action and therefore
barred by the fourteenth amendment. Hurd presented identical material
facts and arose in the District of Columbia, where prior federal courts
had enforced discriminatory covenants.
18. 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).
19. See note 13 supra.
20. The majority in the Civil Rights Cases was willing to concede,
at least as an abstract proposition, that § 2 of the amendment clothed
Congress "with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolish-
ing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." 109 U.S.
at 20. However, the Court limited the practical effect of this view by
holding that the refusal of service in public accommodations on racial
grounds was not a badge of slavery which Congress could eliminate
under the thirteenth amendment. To the contrary is Justice Field's dis-
sent in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873), and
the dissents of Justice Harlan in both the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 36 (1883), and in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 26-38 (1906).
The federal district court in United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D.
Ark. 1903) adopted the dissenters' broad view of the legislative poten-
tial of the amendment.
21. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
22. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1906). This deci-
sion repudiated the notion that the thirteenth amendment could support
legislation guaranteeing the basic civil rights of Negroes, as envisioned
[Vol. 53: 641
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The Court in the instant case held that section 1982 bars all
racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or
rental of property, and that the statute, so construed, is a valid
exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the thirteenth
amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court first consid-
ered the argument that the statute granted only the legal capacity
to purchase property.23 Relying on Hurd, the Court rejected
this argument, stating that the statute grants "the same right"
to purchase property as white citizens in fact enjoy, and not
merely an abstract "right" or capacity to purchase property.24
In Hurd, however, the racially restrictive covenants had been
judicially enforced. Thus, the issue of whether non-governmen-
tal racial discrimination which denies Negroes the right to lease
or purchase property violates section 1982 had not yet been ad-
judicated.25 From the legislative history the Court concluded
that both the sponsors and opponents of the Act viewed it as
prohibiting all racial discrimination which denied the fundamen-
tal rights enumerated in the Act.26 Turning to the structure of
the Act, the Court noted that section two only authorizes criminal
sanctions against persons who, under color of law, deprive Ne-
groes of rights guaranteed by section one. From this, the Court
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Even the majority in the Civil Rights
Cases had recognized such disabilities as "inseparable incidents of the
institution." 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883). See 203 U.S. 1, 30-33 (1906)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. This position was urged by respondents. Brief for Respond-
ents at 8-24. It was adopted by Justices Harlan and White in dissent.
392 U.S. at 452-53.
24. The Jones Court pointed out that since the covenants in Hurd
covered only two-thirds of the lots contained in the city block, a holding
that § 1982 grants no more than the bare capacity to purchase would have
permitted enforcement of the discriminatory covenants because the
Negroes would be capable of purchasing elsewhere. Id. at 418-19.
25. The district court in the instant case found it to be "well
settled" that § 1982 was directed only toward governmental action,
citing Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) and Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917). The court of appeals, although affirming, was less cer-
tain. 379 F.2d 33, 44-45. The Jones majority noted that prior cases had
"simply asserted" that, after the 1870 re-enactment, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was directed against governmental action, without explain-
ing the reasons for this conclusion. 392 U.S. at 420-21 n.25, 437 n.73.
26. See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Trumbull of Illinois, sponsor
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, stating that the bill would "break down
all discrimination between black men and white men," quoted at 392
U.S. at 432. The Court stressed that the Congress of 1866 was aware
that infringement of these rights could be as effectively accomplished
by individual as by state action, and that language of the Act was
broader than would have been necessary had Congress merely intended
to annul discriminatory state statutes. Id. at 423-24.
19691
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concluded that section two was inter.ded to exempt private viola-
tions of section one rights from its criminal sanctions.2 7  The
Court also found that the 1870 re-enactment did not place a four-
teenth amendment limitation on the Act. It stated that repeals
by implication are not favored, especially when there is no evi-
dence indicating congressional intent to limit the 1866 Act by the
1870 re-enactment.28
The Court then considered the question of congressional
authority to enact such legislation under the thirteenth amend-
ment.29 The Civil Rights Cases3" had at least tacitly recognized
that congressional authority under the thirteenth amendment
included the power to eradicate all badges and incidents of
slavery. The Court found that Congress, in enacting section
1982, had determined that one such badge is racial discrimination
in the sale or rental of property.31 The Court concluded that
Congress can, under the thirteenth amendment, protect the right
to purchase property free from racial discrimination.
27. Section 2 of the 1866 Act provides:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any
right secured or protected by this act . . . on account of such
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery
or involuntary servitude . . . or by reason of his color or race
* * ' shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
This provision, as amended, is now contained in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
28. On the contrary, the Court concluded that since congressional
concern had shifted by 1870 to the activities of private groups such as
the Ku Klux Klan, it would be unreasonable to assume that Congress
intended the re-enactment to exempt private violations from the 1866
Act. 392 U.S. at 436-37.
29. It has been consistently held that the power of Congress to
enforce the provisions of the thirteenth amendment by appropriate legis-
lation includes the power to enact laws cperating directly on the acts of
individuals, whether sanctioned by state authority or not. Clyatt v.
United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
23 (1883).
30. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); see note 20 supra.
31. Mr. Justice Stewart's majority opinion stated:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict
the free exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave
system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities
became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial dis-
crimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to
buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a
relic of slavery.
392 U.S. at 441-43. In so holding the Court overruled Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), as expressing a view of congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment that was "incompatible with the his-
tory and purpose of the amendment itself." 392 U.S. at 443 n.78.
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Although the Court characterized its holding as consistent
with prior law, it is in fact a distinct departure from previous
decisions. The Court's reliance on Hurd to establish a broad
interpretation of the "right" granted by section 1982 is, at best,
questionable. In that case, the right of Negroes to purchase from
willing sellers had been negated by property owners who ob-
tained federal court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.
Thus, the Hurd decision did not turn on the scope of the right
granted by section 1982, but rather on the ground that discrim-
inatory governmental action is prohibited both by constitutional
and statutory provisions. "2
While the Court's use of precedent may be open to question,
its holding that section 1982 is valid thirteenth amendment legis-
lation can be supported by the legislative history of both the
amendment itself and the other acts enacted under it. 33 His-
torical sources indicate that many members of Congress believed
that both the constitutional and statutory provisions would
guarantee basic civil rights against encroachment by either of-
ficial or private action.3 4
32. The Hurd Court indicated that federal judicial enforcement of
the covenants would be barred even in the absence of the statute, on the
ground that enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the
United States. Under this rationale, the Court could bar enforcement
by simply exercising its general supervisory power over the federal
courts. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30 (1948).
33. Following ratification of the thirteenth amendment, a number
of bills were introduced to implement it. Some were rejected as "too
narrowly conceived, being based on the war power, confined to the
rebel states, and aimed only at the annulment of bad state laws."
J. NBRoEK, supra note 6, at 177. Others, seeking to prevent abuses
by directly reaching individual acts, became law, e.g., Peonage Abolition
Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); Slave Kidnapping Act, ch. 86, 14 Stat.
50 (1866).
34. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 6, at 159-97; Hamilton, supra note
6, at 59-64. Professor tenBroek concludes:
Beyond toppling over the corpse of slavery, most if not all ele-
ments of the congressional opposition asserted that the amend-
ment would guarantee to the emancipated Negro a basic mini-
mum of civil rights-equality before the law, protection in life
and person, opportunity to live, work, and move about-and
that Congress would be empowered to safeguard and protect
these rights.
J. TENBRoEK, supra note 6, at 162.
In opposition to this interpretation, Mr. Justice Harlan urged that
the legislative history was ambiguous, and that a conclusion that §
1982 was intended to reach only state action "may equally well be
drawn." 392 U.S. at 454. That the legislative history is inconclusive
was previously recognized in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Since this is so, the question is not whether a contrary infer-
ence can be drawn but whether it should be drawn. The Jones dissent
fails to provide any basis for adopting one interpretation over the other
1969]
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Although there are obvious difficulties with the standard
set forth in section 1982, namely "the same right" to purchase
property that whites enjoy, the Court made no effort to deal with
them. It is clear that a seller can always refuse to sell to a par-
ticular white purchaser since the latter has no "right to purchase"
in the sense of an ability to require the seller to deal with him.
Thus the Negro purchaser cannot obtain a "right to purchase" of
that kind by virtue of the statute. However, a white buyer
does have a "right to purchase" in the sense that he has the op-
portunity to negotiate a purchase of the property since he is not
turned away because of his race. The Negro, on the other hand,
is in fact rejected before he has the opportunity to negotiate.
Thus he does not have "the same right" to purchase as whites
enjoy. The Court in Jones may have adopted this view of the
"right" guaranteed by section 1982.35
Because of the absence of an analysis of the "right" that
whites enjoy, the Court's subsequent references to the "basic
civil rights" guaranteed by the statute partake of this ambiguity.
The holding appears to ban all racial discrimination abridging
the "basic civil right" to purchase or lease property.3 If this
beyond the obvious declaration that the majority decision "entails the
resolution of important and difficult issues." 392 U.S. at 477.
Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that many of the legislators would
logically have regarded a bill banning private racial discrimination in
all property transactions as "a great intrusion on individual liberty."
392 U.S. at 473-74. The fact that the bill received no criticism on
this point was "strong additional evidence" to Justice Harlan that it
was not regarded as extending so far. On the facts of Jones, this
assumes one of the major questions to be decided: whether the refusal
of a developer to sell solely because of the purchaser's race is a purely
private transaction which the statute cannot reach. Thus, this criticism
does not appear to provide a satisfactory basis for concluding that § 1982
cannot ban the discrimination in the instant case.
35. For example, the Court referred to the "fact" that, when prop-
erty is placed on the market for whites only, whites have a "right"
denied to Negroes. 392 U.S. at 421. The Jones court viewed Hurd as
having "squarely held" that a Negro citizen who is denied the oppor-
tunity to purchase the home he wants solely because of his race has
suffered the kind of injury § 1982 was designed to prevent. Id. at 419.
While this vastly overstates the Hurd holding by omitting reference
to judicial enforcement, it supports the inference that the Court con-
sidered the "right" to purchase as tantamount to the opportunity to do
SO.
36. The majority in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883),
distinguished between what it considered "social" rights, guaranteed by
the 1875 Civil Rights Act, and "those fundamental rights which are the
essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right ... to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,"
which it thought Congress had secured in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Jones Court quoted this discussion of "fundamental" rights with
[VCol. 53: 641
CASE COMMENTS
view is correct, whenever an individual is denied this "right" he
has the power to require the discriminator to deal with him in a
nondiscriminatory manner. Even if the right is viewed as the op-
portunity to be considered as a purchaser, this result may still be
undesirable to the extent that it fails to consider the strength of
competing interests in the particular discriminatory occurrence.
Factors such as the type of discriminator, the extent and effect
of the discrimination, the commercial or personal nature of the
relationship, and the effect the ban might have on the compet-
ing interests of both parties should be considered. 37 Moreover,
it may be objected that the Court's result provides a remedy for
victims of racial discrimination but not for victims of other types
of discrimination which also deny "basic civil rights.)3 8
Under the Court's analysis, a homeowner who indicates a
willingness to lease a room in his home and subsequently re-
fuses to lease to a Negro solely because of his race has infringed
a "basic civil right." Since the property is in effect placed on the
market for whites only, the Negro has been denied "the same
right" that whites enjoy, in the sense that whites have the oppor-
tunity to be considered as potential lessees. Thus, on the Jones
reasoning, the Negro plaintiff would arguably prevail under
section 1982 in an action to force the owner to lease him the
premises. Such a result would be contrary to the recent legis-
lative determination in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that the
individual homeowner should generally be excluded from fair
housing provisions when either selling or renting his own home
or a portion thereof.39 Mr. Justice Harlan urged in dissent that
approval, and referred to the 1866 Act as guaranteeing "basic civil
rights," 392 U.S. at 432, 435, 441.
37. The Court's opinion indicates no recognition of these or other
factors. For example, in considering the type of discriminator, there
appear to be substantial distinctions between a housing developer, as in
Jones, an owner selling his own home, and an owner renting a room in
his home. Valuable discussions of these and other competing interests
may be found in Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial
Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CA w. L. REv. 1 (1964); St.
Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Ac-
tion, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 McH.
L. REv. 993 (1961); Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A Consti-
tutional Dilemma, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 59 (1967).
38. Where, for example, a member of a religious minority is de-
nied the opportunity to purchase property solely because of his religion,
the Jones result provides no remedy because the statute only proscribes
discrimination on the grounds of race or color.
39. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73. Title VIII, Fair Hous-
ing, contains comprehensive provisions dealing with discrimination on
grounds of race, religion, and national origin. The Act exempts from
its provisions discriminatory refusals to sell or rent by the owner of a
19691
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in this context it is inappropriate for the Court to ignore the
legislative judgment by extending the scope of section 1982 be-
yond the recent Act. Congress found it necessary, Harlan sug-
gested, to exempt from coverage "relationships so personal in
nature," and therefore the Court should not interpret section 1982
so as to eliminate such exemptions. 40 If there are some discrim-
inatory acts which are not subject to the ban, the Jones opinion
does not provide a satisfactory basis for determining what they
are.
41
In addition, it appears that the Civil Rights Act of 1968 will,
in stages, meet a large portion of the problems of racial discrim-
ination in the sale and rental of housing. While it affords no
relief to the petitioners in Jones, it will bar similar discrimination
by developers as of January 1, 1969.L2 Since the problem raised
by the facts of the instant case will soon be solved legislatively,
and since the Court's decision can logically be extended to ban
discriminatory acts not proscribed by the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the Court's failure to clarify the scope of its decision is
unfortunate.4 3 The decision is formally consistent with the cur-
single-family home, provided he does not own, or have any interest in,
more than three such homes at a time. After December 31, 1969, the
exemption will apply only if the house is sold or rented without the
services of a real estate broker, and without publication of any adver-
tisement that indicates a limitation based on race, color, religion, or
national origin. § 803(b) (1).
The Act further exempts from its provisions the rental of rooms or
units in dwellings which contain living quarters for not more than four
families, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living
quarters as his residence. § 803(b) (2).
40. 392 U.S. at 478.
41. E.g., Robison, supra note 11, at 462, suggests that the line
could be drawn by "balancing the benefits of equality against the
benefits of privacy and freedom from governmental control." Sengstock
& Sengstock, supra note 37, at 119, conclude that a workable key for
distinguishing activities in which discrimination is permissible from
those in which it is not is whether "the offer to establish a relationship
is or is not made public."
42. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73, was enacted after oral
argument in the instant case, but before the decision was announced.
Section 803 (a) (2) provides that the Act will be applicable on January
1, 1969, to persons who attempt to buy houses from developers. Such
persons will be entitled to injunctive relief and damages from devel-
opers who discriminate. Petitioners in the instant case would be barred
from obtaining relief under the Act since the discrimination occurred
prior to April 11, 1968, the date on whic'i the Act became law, and be-
cause the claim would be barred by the 180-day limitation period set
in §§ 810 (b), 812 (a).
43. Mr. Justice Harlan urged that the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 so diminished the public importance of the case that the
writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.
392 U.S. at 479-80.
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rent shift of civil rights activity from the courts to the legis-
lature. The Court's recognition of broad congressional authority
under section two of the thirteenth amendment and its apparent
deference to the exercise of that authority are also consistent with
recent opinions. 44 Nonetheless, the instant case may in fact be
contrary to this attitude of deference, since Congress has made
known its judgment regarding coverage of and exemptions to fair
housing legislation prior to the announcement of this decision.4 5
Thus the importance of the case appears to lie in its prece-
dential value for future extensions of section 1982 beyond the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 regarding individual
acts of discrimination. Jones is also significant in that it gives
Congress a carte blanche to utilize the thirteenth amendment to
eliminate what it considers badges and incidents of slavery.
It may well be asserted that, given the enormity of the prob-
lem of racial discrimination in housing, the Court's decision is
justified. Since it rests on constitutional grounds, Jones secures
the rights against possible future legislative termination. None-
theless, the absence of any apparent limitations on the Court's
holding, coupled with its failure to discuss the relationship be-
44. In recent decisions, the Court has expressed a broad view of
congressional power to legislate under the enabling sections of both
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. It has stressed that under
both amendments the test of appropriateness of challenged legislation is
that formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819):
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (fifteenth amend-
ment); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783-84 (1966) (concurring
opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.) (four-
teenth amendment). These cases have not only stressed broad leg-
islative authority under these amendments, but also judicial defer-
ence to the legislative judgment.
In Jones, the Court indicated that the only limitation on the power
of Congress to determine what constitutes a badge and incident of
slavery is rationality. 392 U.S. at 440-41. The similarity between the
language of deference to the legislative judgment in Katzenbach and
Guest, and that in Jones, and the adoption of the same test of the appro-
priateness of legislation for all three amendments may thus indicate that
the thirteenth amendment is on its way to becoming a major source of
congressional authority to protect civil rights against private acts of
racial discrimination.
45. In light of the statements, see cases cited note 44 supra,
stressing the deference the Court will pay to the legislative judgment,
the judgment of the 1968 Congress would appear to have been at
least relevant to determination of the breadth of the instant decision.
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tween its decision and the 1968 Act, present serious questions
regarding both the limits of permissible individual activity and
the proper function of the Court in a democracy.
Criminal Procedure: Frisk Permissible Where Reasonable
Suspicion of Criminal Activity Exists
After observing petitioner's suspicious behavior' near a store
for 10 to 12 minutes, a police officer, suspecting a robbery,
approached petitioner, identified himself and asked petitioner's
name. After mumbling an answer, the petitioner was frisked
and the gun he was carrying was seized. He was then arrested
and charged with carrying a dangerous weapon. A motion to
suppress the gun's admission into evidence was denied and the
petitioner was convicted. The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that a police officer, observing conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the suspect may be
armed and dangerous, is entitled to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons
which may be used to assault him, and that any weapons seized
thereby may be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 2
Judicial efforts in enforcing this amendment in the context of
police practice have met with limited success. Enforcement has
been primarily sought through the "exclusionary rule" extended
1. The petitioner, with a companion, continuously paced up and
down a sidewalk, pausing each time to look in a certain store window.
During this time, a third person stopped to talk briefly with petitioner
and his companion, then departed. A short time later the petitioner
and his companion departed and were observed talking to the third man.
The police officer intervened at this point. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
5-7 (1968).
2. Identical or closely similar provisions are found in state con-
stitutions. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 7; MIxW. STAT. § 626.08 (1965).
For examples of hypothetical search warrants, see A. SPECTER & M.
KATZ, POLICE GUIDE TO SEARCH SEIZURE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION
54-64 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SPEcTER].
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to the state courts in 1961 by Mapp v. Ohio.3 The rule forbids
admission of evidence seized from a suspect in violation of his
constitutional rights,4 thereby deterring illegal searches by fore-
warning police authorities that the fruits of such searches will be
inadmissible at trial.5 Where no trial follows the illegal search,
however, the exclusionary rule is of little utility."
A search pursuant to a valid warrant, directing an officer to
enter and search a specified premise,7 is not, of course, violative
of the fourth amendment. However, before a search warrant
can be validly issued, the officer's sworn statement must satisfy
the magistrate that there is probable cause8 to believe that a
search of the premises will uncover the article to be seized.9
There are instances where a search may be properly con-
ducted without a search warrant, as when consent is freely given
by a competent individual.10 However, the most significant ex-
ception to the search warrant requirement is that a search may
be incident to a lawful arrest.". The search must be "contem-
poraneous '1 2 with the arrest, and the arrest cannot be a pretext
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This was ex-
tended to preclude evidence illegally seized, copied, and returned, then
made the object of an otherwise valid search warrant. Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Holmes, J., in
writing the opinion of the Court, said, "The essence of a provision for-
bidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely that
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it
shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
5. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
6. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. R. DAHL & A. BOYLE, JR., PROCEDURE AND THE LAW OF ARREST
SEARCH AND SEizuRE 132 (1961) [hereinafter cited as DAML]; see Mm.
STAT. § 626.05 (1965). In some cases private citizens may be issued
search warrants, as well as be authorized to make arrests and carry out
other functions normally performed by police officers, but for purposes
of this Comment only the performance of these duties by police officers
will be considered.
8. See note 2 supra, and accompanying text. For a discussion of
probable cause, see notes 19-28 infra, and accompanying text.
9. DAHL 133.
10. See DAHL 167-172; SPECTER 51-52; L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, JR.
& D. ROTENBERG, DETENTION OF CEIVIE 156-170 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TIFFANY].
11. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950); see Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 41 (1963). It has been estimated that over 90%
of searches involved in later judicial proceedings are incident to arrests.
See TIFFANY 122.
12. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); see Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
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for the search.13 Once the arrest is lawfully made, the police
may search the person arrested and the immediate vicinity of the
arrest 4 to discover and seize the evidence of the crime.', Such a
search is lawful even though there may be adequate time to ob-
tain a search warrant.:6
Even though the search-warrant-probable-cause issue is not
present in a search incident to a lawful arrest, the probable cause
test is still present. An arrest warrant must also show probable
cause, and an arrest may be made without a warrant if the officer
has probable cause' 7 to believe a felony has been committed by
the person to be arrested. s
Probable cause thus emerges as the central concept of both
searches and arrests, with or without warrants. The generally
accepted definition of probable cause was stated in Carroll v.
United States:19 "If the facts and circumstances before the of-
ficer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in
believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient."20
Probable cause 2' is more than suspicion 22 or good faith2 3 on the
officer's part. Specificity is the key element.24 In arrests with-
out a warrant, the probable cause must be such that it would
have justified the issuance of an arrest warrant in similar circum-
13. Where the existence of probable cause to arrest is at issue, it
must be decided independent of any evidence turned up in the post-
arrest search. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
See also Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-81 (1931);
DAHL 155 and cases there cited. This rule is not always followed in
practice. See TiFrANrY 122-23.
14. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); see James
v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 37 (1965); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
486 (1964); C. JONES, MTNNESOTA POLICE LAW MANuAL 2-3 (1967).
15. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41 (1963); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1950); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
283, 292 (1914). Practically everyone arrested is searched. TiFANY
121.
16. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
17. See notes 19-28 infra, and accompanying text.
18. DABn 17; C. JONES, supra note 14, at 3-4.
19. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20. Id. at 161.
21. "Probable cause" is the more commonly used term, but the
Supreme Court has indicated that substantially similar terms mean the
same thing. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963) (reasonable
belief); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478 n.6 (1963)
(reasonable grounds).
22. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (mere
suspicion); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959) (strong
reason to suspect).
23. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); see Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968) and cases therein
cited; SPECTER 36-38.
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stances.25 The concept embodies practicalities, not technicalities;
it justifies action by the reasonable and prudent man, and is
thus a working concept rather than a precisely defined one.26
Despite the absence of tightly drawn standards, the Supreme
Court has indicated it will scrutinize non-warrant arrests and
seizures,27 and has declared that warrants should be obtained
whenever practicable. 28
In many instances there is not probable cause to arrest, but an
officer's suspicions are aroused nevertheless. Police are trained
to recognize the unusual;29 their power and obligation to investi-
gate suspicious circumstances are axiomatic.30  There is some
authority for the proposition that police have a common law
power to stop and question a suspicious individual.31 This prac-
tice, when properly conducted, is seen as an effective means of
preventing crime, whether it results in a valid arrest or in deter-
rence of one intending criminal conduct.32 Where an individual
having no criminal intentions is stopped, the momentary intru-
sion on his freedom is thought to be justified by society's in-
terest in preventing and detecting crime.3 3
This stop and question practice is seldom without its dif-
ficulties. Unlike an arrest, which requires probable cause suf-
ficient to withstand judicial scrutiny, a detention of this nature
occurs on the mere suspicion of the police officer.3 4 The prac-
tice is, therefore, subject to abuse because the officer is seldom
called on to justify his suspicions.35
25. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); see
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959).
26. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). See also
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 225-26 (1964).
27. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
103 (1959).
28. See cases cited in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
29. See, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. Cnmx. L.C. & P.S. 433,
433-34 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
30. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
31. See Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58
J. Crn. L.C. & P.S. 465, 479 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pilcher].
See also Note, 28 U. Pirr. L. REv. 488, 491-93 (1967).
32. See TIFFANY 3, 16, 74. But see Schwartz 452.
33. See H. PACKER, THE Lnvrrs oF THm CRIMINAL SANcTIoN 176-77
(1968) [hereinafter cited as PAcKER]; Schwartz 433-34.
34. See TIFFANY 38-43.
35. Schwartz 449; see TirANY 90. This practice has been criti-
cized as leaving too much to the discretion of the individual policeman.
See Schwartz 444-48.
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This type of detention comes under the rubric of "field in-
terrogation."3 6  Generally it covers any situation in which an
individual is questioned by police concerning a crime or suspected
crime while not in a police station.3 7 But the term also desig-
nates the action of a police officer when he "checks out" an indi-
vidual by questioning him in an attempt to find out who he is,
where he lives and what he is doing in the area, without regard
to any crime or suspected crime.3 8 Failure by an individual to
respond to these questions may result in arrest, often for vag-
rancy or loitering.3 9 Demonstrably false answers may produce
the same result.40
This practice is accompanied in many instances by a frisk4l -
a careful and thorough search of the outer clothing designed to
find weapons carried by the suspect.42 So-called "stop and frisk
36. Also known as field detention, field stop, or stop.
37. Pilcher 465.
38. See id. Field stops average two or three minutes in length and
seldom extend beyond six minutes. Pilcher 476, 478.
39. See TIFFANY 59-64; Remington, The Law Relating to "On the
Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and
Police Arrest Privileges in General, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 16 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
40. TIFFANY 68-72. The threat of arrest, expressed or implied,
may motivate the suspect "willingly" to cooperate. TIFFANY 64.
41. TIFFANY 45-48; Schwartz 436.
42. TIFFANY 46. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). Where
a frisk reveals no dangerous weapons, a more thorough search is often
undertaken for contraband or evidence of crime. Tiffany 84-85, 128-29
passim. Where no probable cause exists, such searches are illegal.
See notes 14 and 19-28 supra, and accompanying text. One relatively
frequent manifestation of this facet of field interrogation is harassment
of minority groups. Stop and frisk practices, known in police jargon as
"aggressive patrol," increase tension and heighten community distrust
toward police. NATIONAL ADVISORY COM1V sSION ON CVm DISORDERS,
REPORT 301-05 (Bantam ed. 1968); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE POLICE AND THE
COMMUNITY 53-54, 85-87 (1966); PRESIDENT'S COM'VnMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL SUR-
VEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS 331-35 (1967). See generally
IINN. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, REPORT ON POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN IINNEAPOLIS
AND ST. PAUL (1965). This is especially true in ghettos and other low-
income, high-crime areas. NATIONAL A.DviSORY COMMVISSION ON CIV=
DISORDERS 304-05 (Bantam ed. 1968); see G. EDWARDS, THE POLICE ON
THE URBAN FRONTIER (1968); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, STUDIES IN CRIME AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS, § II at 71-76 (1967);
Schwartz 446-47.
This antagonism is reinforced by the widely held attitude on the
part of police administrators that "aggressive patrol" in high-crime areas
is a necessary part of crime prevention in that it makes police presence
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statutes" authorizing this general practice by police officers are
in effect in six states.43
The Court in Terry summarized the difficult issues inherent
in the police power to stop and frisk, and noted the conflict be-
tween police arguments for flexibility in on-the-street situations
and commentators' views opposing coercive searches without
probable cause to arrest.44 In discussing the shortcomings of the
exclusionary rule, the Court noted the "protean variety" of street
encounters between citizens and police, from friendly to hostile,
and the inability of any judicial rule to deal adequately with
such encounters not culminating in trial.4 5 The Court rejected
lower court distinctions between a "stop" and a "seizure," and
between a "frisk" and a "search," reasoning that such distinctions
suggest a stage of police-citizen contact immune from fourth
amendment protection, and ignore constitutional limitations im-
posed on the scope, as well as on the initiation, of police action.4 6
The fourth amendment inquiry, said the Court, is the reason-
ableness of the search under the circumstances, regardless of
whether the action is a frisk or a "full-blown search. 4 7  In de-
termining the reasonableness of the search, the Court balanced
the safety of the police officer making the frisk as well as the
government's interest in effective crime prevention and detec-
tion, against the defendant's annoying experience of undergoing
obvious and thus discourages potential criminal activity. TIFFANY 88.
This attitude is criticized in Schwartz 436.
43. See ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 118 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 462 (1953); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 41, § 98 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-829 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. CODE CRnw. PRoc. § 180-a (McKinney ed.
1953); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-13-33--77-13-35 (1953). All are substan-
tially similar to the New York statute:
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public
place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed
or is about to commit a felony .... and may demand of him
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for question-
ing pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that he isin danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dan-
gerous weapon. If the police finds such a weapon or any other
thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may
take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at
which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or
arrest such person.
But see note 71 infra, and accompanying text.
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1968). See also Lafave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron Peters, and
Beyond, 67 MAIcH. L. REV. 40 (1968). For a comprehensive summation
of both views, see PACKER 176-81.
45. 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968).
46. Id. at 16-19.
47. Id. at 19.
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the search. The Court, in rejecting petitioner's argument that
no frisk could be conducted without probable cause to arrest,
differentiated first between the frisk as a limited search for
weapons and the more extensive search that is incident to an
arrest, and secondly between the limited intrusion of the frisk
upon individual freedom and the more extended intrusion that
formal arrest entails.48 The Court concluded that a police of-
ficer, in the absence of probable cause but observing conduct
which in the light of his experience leads him to conclude that
criminal activity "may be afoot," and believing the suspect may
be armed and dangerous must have a "narrowly drawn author-
ity"49 to conduct a carefully limited search of the suspect's outer
clothing to discover dangerous weapons.
The decision raises several points, which will be discussed
seriatim. First, the administration of the new standard of "rea-
sonable suspicion 50 might present difficulty to the lower courts
in deciding whether the requisite grounds for a frisk are present.
Second, by legitimizing certain search procedures based on less
than probable cause, the Court 'has probably increased the
chances that the police will more frequently acknowledge these
practices in future criminal prosecutions. Third, there is a ques-
tion as to the permissible scope of the frisk, in terms of what ob-
jects may be seized. And finally, the Court has arguably created
unnecessary problems in refusing to adjudicate the question of
the stop itself.
* The Court appears anxious to relate the new concept of
reasonable suspicion to the concept of probable cause, which is
more familiar, both historically and constitutionally. In legiti-
mizing frisks based on less than probable cause, the Court does
not abrogate the test of reasonableness as it states that the
facts available to the officer must "warrant a man of reasonable
caution. in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.
48. Id. at 25-27.
49. Id. at 27.
50. The term "reasonable suspicion" is used in this Comment as a
convenient term to denote that which, in the absence of probable cause,justifies reasonable and permissible governmental intrusion on rights
protected by the fourth amendment. The opinion of the Court carefully
avoids the use of the term (except when quoting N.Y. CODE CIMw. P.§ 180-a; 'see note 76 infra), and emphasizes instead that the intrusion
must be reasonable under all the circumstances. In this respect, the
Court's implication that justifiable governmental intrusion should not be
shortened to a shibboleth is well taken. There is indication, however,
that for reasons of convenience the holding of the Court in Terry will
be referred to in terms of a standard of "reasonable suspicion." See
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 71 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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... '"5 This standard originates from the test for probable cause
enunciated in Carroll v. United States.5 2 Inarticulate hunches
or good faith, never enough to satisfy the standard of probable
cause, are similarly insufficient for a finding of reasonable sus-
picion.
There is undeniably a basic similarity between probable
cause and reasonable suspicion. Both empower a policeman to
take action against one thought to be involved in the commission
of crime. But the allowable action is different; the policeman is
enabled to arrest on probable cause, whereas he is enabled only
to frisk on reasonable suspicion. An arrest is the first step in the
process of prosecution, and the arrested person is assured of
quick arraignment before a magistrate. A frisk, on the other
hand, entails no judicial overview, and is visible in the courtroom
only when the person frisked is subsequently arrested.
Where a frisk reveals evidence which becomes the basis of
probable cause to arrest, as in Terry,53 courts ruling on motions to
suppress must determine whether the policeman had the requi-
site grounds of reasonable suspicion. This will involve new and
difficult questions of determining the boundaries of the reason-
able suspicion standard, and some commentators have criticized
such a standard because of this uncertainty.54 But both stand-
ards are a means of measuring facts and inferences to determine
the constitutionality of police action under the circumstances,
and the certainty of probable cause is due mainly to nearly two
centuries of application, rather than to any inherent certainty
in its conception. Much of the uncertainty of the standard will
likely be resolved as it is applied in future cases and perhaps the
new standard is criticized merely because it is new.
In the absence of more clearly defined precedential support,
the judiciary will not be eager to overrule a policeman's judg-
ment and conclude that the initiation of a frisk was unreasonable.
In Sibron v. New York,55 a companion case to Terry, the Supreme
Court did so,"' but whether lower courts will feel free to act as
51. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (emphasis added).
52. 267 U.S. 132 (1952); see note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
53. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
54. See, e.g., Schwartz, 444-45.
55. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
56. The Court reasoned that petitioner's observed association with
known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period was not sufficient tojustify either probable cause or a belief that petitioner was armed and
dangerous, and hence a frisk was improper and the heroin seized was
inadmissible. Id. at 63-64. In addition, the Court held that the frisk
went beyond the bounds articulated in Terry. In Sibron, the petitioner
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independently, especially in close cases, is not at all certain.
Lower courts have shown marked tendencies to sustain police
findings of suspicious activity,57 with one court citing the "intui-
tive knowledge" of the policeman as assuring a "protective, as
well as definitive" standard.58 Such reliance on the judgment
of one whose judgment is, or should be, at issue does not en-
courage hopes that police conduct will be subject to scrutiny in
the courtroom.
A second probable effect of these decisions will be increased
visibility of stop and frisk practices in the courtroom. Since
evidence turned up in a search incident to an "arrest" cannot be a
basis for establishing probable cause for the arrest,5 9 police in
some cases had struggled, after the fact, to pinpoint a pre-search
"moment of arrest" and to establish probable cause to justify
it, 60 so that evidence seized would not be excluded. These police
efforts to preserve evidence can hinder the judicial task of deal-
ing with the legality of the search. With the power of police to
frisk without probable cause now established by Terry, police
need only show "reasonable suspicion" in order to introduce
weapons and perhaps certain other objects 6' into evidence. Since
reasonable suspicion is easier to show than probable cause, more
arrestees than might otherwise be the case will now be brought
to trial, and the courts will not be faced with strained arguments
of probable cause in those cases.
Once the existence of reasonable suspicion is determined, it
is still necessary to question whether the frisk was lawful in
scope-whether it adhered to constitutional limitations by not
going beyond that necessary to deV-rmine the existence of dan-
gerous weapons.62 In this respect, the Supreme Court seems
prepared to give the officer the benefit of a legitimate doubt.
Citing the numbers of law enforcement officials killed and in-
jured each year by concealable weapons, 63 the Court concludes
that it would be clearly unreasonable to require policemen to
was convicted under N.Y. CODE CIMv. P. § 180-a, New York's "stop and
frisk statute." See note 43 supra.
57. See Schwartz 444-45.
58. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 245, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599, 273
N.Y.S.2d 217, 222 (1966). This case was joined with Sibron and af-
firmed by the Supreme Court, though on different grounds from the
trial court. See notes 65-69 infra, and accompanying text.
59. See note 13 supra.
60. See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); cf. Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267-72 (1960).
61. See notes 65-71 infra, and accompanying text.
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
63. Id. at 23-24.
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subject themselves to unnecessary risks in protecting their own
lives and the lives of those nearby.6 4
In the light of this scope, the admissibility of evidence other
than weapons seized during a valid frisk becomes an issue. The
Court was presented with this issue in a second companion case 65
to Terry, but avoided a direct answer. Here a police officer,
frisking a suspect believed to have committed a burglary, dis-
covered and removed a package of burglar's tools. The Court
held that the tools were properly admitted in evidence. This
decision, however, was based not on the lower court's finding
that reasonable suspicion existed, but on the Supreme Court's
own independent finding of probable cause.66 The arresting
officer testified that the package of burglar's tools felt like it
might have been a knife, 7 a fact that the Court apparently
found significant, 8 though in a search incident to a lawful arrest
any evidence taken from the suspect's clothing is admissible.6 9
Had the Court accepted the trial court's determination that mere
reasonable suspicion existed, a question would have been pre-
sented as to the admissibility of the burglar's tools. The out-
come probably would have been the same, however, as the per-
missible scope of the search-a limited patting of the outer cloth-
ing designed to locate weapons-had not been violated.
To take the situation a step further, an expensive fountain
pen which felt like it "might have been" a knife, or a bulky piece
of woman's jewelry which might have been a gun would seem to
be admissible even when the suspect is frisked on suspicion of a
crime other than burglary.7 0 The policeman's belief as to what
objects might have been weapons, however, must be a legitimate
64. Id. at 24. It seems safe to assume lower courts will follow the
lead of the Court on this point.
65. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
66. Id. at 66-67. The trial court had found that the policeman had
the requisite "reasonable suspicion" under New York's "stop and frisk
statute" to frisk petitioner. 392 U.S. 40, 44 (1968). See note 44 supra.
67. 392 U.S. 49. The tools consisted of a tension bar, six picks and
two Allen wrenches in a plastic envelope. Id. at 69.
68. See id. at 67.
69. See note 15 supra, and accompanying text. Harlan seems to be
referring to the same anomaly in noting that the Court's observation
that the search was "restrained" is merely a factual observation, with-
out particular legal significance in this context. 392 U.S. 40, 77 (1968).
70. Indeed, to hold otherwise would put the officer in an impos-
sible situation by requiring that he ascertain the nature of the object
without removing it from the suspect's clothing. The consequences of
guessing incorrectly would mean losing the evidence at trial at best,
or leaving a weapon on the suspect's person at worst.
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one. If a policeman feels and removes a thin paper envelope of
heroin, it would be stretching the rationale of Terry to allow
subsequent admission of the drug as evidence. An extension of
the frisk past the limited search or patting of the outer clothing
is permissible on reasonable suspicion that a weapon exists be-
cause of the necessity of removing the danger to the officer and
persons nearby. However, such an extension absent a reasonable
suspicion that a weapon exists is beyond the scope permitted in
Terry-beyond that necessary for the protection of the officer
and bystanders.7 1 This would be true even though some stop
and frisk statutes would seem to legitimize such a seizure.7 2
Finally, there is the curiosity evoked by the Court's refusal to
consider the matter of the stop prior to the frisk. Though the
Court bases its refusal on the grounds that the question was not
squarely presented in either Terry or its companion cases,
73 it
would seem that the stop cannot validly be separated from the
overall frisking process. As Mr. Justice Harlan points out in his
concurring opinion, any individual has a right to walk away from
any other individual, even a policeman, and if a policeman is to
have the power to frisk a suspect, he must also have the power
to stop him.7 4 Harlan sees the power of the police to frisk as a
concomitant of their power to stop,75 with the power to stop
based on the same reasoning the Court follows in justifying the
power to frisk.76  Though this distinction may seem at first
academic, a careful reading of the Terry holding reveals that
nowhere is the power of the police to stop a suspect mentioned.
The Court's mention of the police :power to "investigate" suspi-
cious behavior and to make "reasonable" inquiries, 77 seems to
imply some power to detain a suspect briefly. This result would
71. See note 62 supra, and accompanying text.
72. See 392 U.S. 40, 60 n.20 (1968):
At least some of the activity apparently permitted [by N.Y.
CODE Csnvr. P. § 180-a] under the rubric of searching for dan-
gerous weapons may be permissible only if the "reasonable
suspicion" of criminal activity rises to the level of probable
cause (emphasis added).
The Court apparently was referring to that part of § 180-2 (2) which
allows a policemen to arrest a suspect on the basis of unlawful posses-
sion of "any other thing" found in the course of a search for dangerous
weapons. See note 43 supra.
73. See 392 U.S. 40, 60 n.20 (1968); 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
74. 392 U.S. 1, 31-33 (1968). See also 392 U.S. 1, 34-35 (White,
J., concurring).
75. 392 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1968). See also his concurring opinion in
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 71-73 (1968).
76. See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.
77. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
[Vol. 53:652
CASE COMMENTS
also follow from the belief that police have a power to stop a
suspicious individual at common law.78 But the Court says no-
thing about this alleged power, either in relation to the common
law or the frisking process. Arguably, therefore, a suspect ap-
proached by a policeman could turn and walk away without po-
lice detention to facilitiate the questioning or the frisk. Of
course, if the suspect's action gives rise to probable cause, the
power to arrest-and therefore to stop-arises. But the Court
may be unnecessarily causing confusion over the power to
stop on reasonable suspicion by refusing to treat it in the context
of these cases.
This decision, then, empowering police to frisk on the
grounds of reasonable supicion, brings in its wake a number of
practical difficulties. Though the frisk will now be more visible
in the legal framework, problems concerning both the initiation
and scope of a proper frisk are unresolved, as is the problem of
the stop itself. The holding has been condemned by Mr. Justice
Douglas as giving sweeping new powers to the police to search
persons in the absence of the traditional constitutional basis of
probable cause and as "a long step down the totalitarian path."79
Douglas's implication that police can now search a suspect when-
ever they do not like "the cut of his jib"80 is manifestly false, as
Sibron illustrates.8 ' On the other hand, it is equally misleading to
dismiss the decision as merely legitimizing a long-standing police
practice.82
The significance of the decision lies in the fact that it has
taken a broad area of police field interrogation practices out of
the shadows and placed it squarely in the light of the fourth
amendment. The police are on notice that stop and frisk activities
must henceforth be conducted with full deference to the sus-
pect's constitutional rights. They are on equally clear notice,
however, that such activities, legitimately and reasonably con-
ducted, are acceptable procedures in the detection and preven-
tion of crime.
It would be too much to expect that the exclusionary rule
can, as a result of these cases, significantly affect on-the-street
abuses of stop and frisk practices where the goal, with increasing
78. See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
79. 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968).
80. Id. at 39.
81. 392 U.S. 40 (1968); see notes 55 & 56 supra, and accompanying
text.
82. For an example of this latter approach, see Schwartz 436.
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frequency, is not prosecution but "aggressive patrol."s3 But in
legitimizing the frisk under certain conditions, the Court has in-
creased the chances that it will be visible in cases resulting in
trial, thus allowing the courts some measure of judicial control
over the frisk.
83. Po~lak, To Secure the Individual Rights of the Many, in
LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 49 (G. Hazard, Jr. ed. 1968).
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